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risk management
understanding why is as important 
as understanding how
The management of risk is a key area 
within a number of ACCA papers, and 
exam questions related to this area are 
common. It is vital that students are able 
to apply risk management techniques, 
such as using derivative instruments to 
hedge against risk, and offer advice and 
recommendations as required by the 
scenario in the question. It is also equally 
important that students understand why 
corporations manage risk in theory and in 
practice, because risk management costs 
money but does it actually add more value 
to a corporation? This article explores the 
circumstances where the management of 
risk may lead to an increase in the value of 
a corporation.
Risk, in this context, refers to the volatility 
of  returns (both positive and negative) 
that can be quantified through statistical 
measures such as probabilities, standard 
deviations and correlations between 
different returns. Its management is about 
decisions made to change the volatility of  
returns a corporation is exposed to, for 
example changing a company’s exposure to 
floating interest rates by swapping them to 
fixed rates for a fee. Since business is about 
generating higher returns by undertaking 
risky projects, important management 
decisions revolve around which projects to 
undertake, how they should be financed and 
whether the volatility of  a project’s returns 
(its risk) should be managed.
The volatility of  returns of  a project 
should be managed if  it results in 
increasing the value to a corporation. Given 
that the market value of  a corporation is the 
net present value (NPV) of  its future cash 
flows discounted by the return required 
by its investors, then higher market value 
can either be generated by increasing the 
future cash flows or by reducing investors’ 
required rate of  return (or both). A risk 
management strategy that increases the 
NPV at a lower comparative cost would 
benefit the corporation.
The return required by investors is the 
sum of  the risk free rate and a premium for 
the risk they undertake. If  investors hold 
well-diversified portfolios of  investments 
then they are only exposed to systematic 
risk as their exposure to firm-specific risk 
has been diversified away. Therefore, the risk 
premium of  their required return is based 
on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
Research suggests companies with diverse 
equity holdings do not increase value by 
diversifying company specific risk, as their 
equity holders have already achieved this 
level of  risk diversification. Moreover, risk 
management activity designed to transfer 
systematic risk would not provide additional 
benefits to a corporation because, in perfect 
markets, the benefits achieved from risk 
management activity would at least equal the 
costs of  undertaking such activity. Therefore, 
in a situation of  perfect markets, it may be 
argued that risk management activity is at 
best neutral or at worst detrimental because 
costs would either equal or be more than the 
benefits accrued.
Such an argument would not apply 
to smaller companies which have 
concentrated, non-diversified equity 
holdings. In this case the equity holders, 
because they are exposed to both specific 
and systematic risk, would benefit from 
risk diversification by the company. 
Therefore, whereas larger companies may 
not create value from risk management 
activity, smaller companies can and should 
undertake risk management. However, 
empirical research studies have found that 
risk management is undertaken mostly 
by larger companies with diverse equity 
holdings and not by the smaller companies. 
The accepted reason for this is that the 
costs related to risk management are large 
and mostly fixed. Small companies simply 
can not afford these costs nor can they 
benefit from the economies of  scale that 
large companies can.
In addition to the ability of  larger 
companies to undertake risk management, 
market imperfections may provide the 
motivation for them to do so. Market 
imperfections that exist in the real world, 
as opposed to the perfect world conditions 
assumed by finance or economic theory, 
may provide opportunities to reduce 
volatility in cash flows and thereby reduce 
the costs imposed on a corporation. 
The following discussion considers the 
circumstances which may result in providing 
such opportunities.
TaxaTion
Risk management may help in reducing the 
amount of  tax that a corporation pays by 
reducing the volatility of  the corporation’s 
earnings. Where a corporation faces taxation 
schedules that are progressive (that is the 
corporation pays proportionally higher 
amounts of  tax as its profits increase), by 
reducing the variability of  that corporation’s 
earnings and thereby staying in the same 
low tax bracket will reduce the tax payable.
According to academics, corporations 
could often find themselves in situations 
where they face progressive tax functions, 
for example, when they have previous 
losses which are not written off  or, in the 
case of  multinational corporations, due to 
the taxation treaties which exist between 
different countries. The amount of  taxation 
that can be saved depends upon the 
corporation’s individual circumstances.
insolvency and financial disTress
A corporation may find itself  in a situation 
of  being insolvent when it cannot meet 
its financial obligations as they fall due. 
Financial distress is a situation that is less 
severe than insolvency in that a corporation 
can operate on a day-to-day basis, but it 
finds that these operations are difficult to 
conduct because the parties dealing with it 
are concerned that it may become insolvent 
in the future. When facing financial distress 
a corporation will incur additional costs, 
both direct and indirect, due to the situation 
it is facing.
The main indirect costs of  financial 
distress relate to the higher costs of  
contracting with the corporation’s 
stakeholders, such as customers, employees 
and suppliers. For example, customers may 
demand better warranty schemes or may be 
reluctant to buy a product due to concerns 
about the corporation’s ability to fulfil its 
warranty; employees may demand higher 
salaries; senior management may ask for 
golden hellos before agreeing to work for the 
corporation; and suppliers may be unwilling 
to offer favourable credit terms.
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Academics exploring this area postulate 
that because stakeholders are subject 
to the corporation’s full risk, as opposed 
to only systematic risk, which is faced 
by the corporation’s equity holders, the 
stakeholders would demand greater 
compensation for their participation. Where 
an organisation actively manages its risk 
and prevents (or reduces the possibility of) 
situations of  financial distress, it will find 
it easier to contract with its stakeholders 
and at a lower cost. Hence, the more 
volatile the cash flows of  a corporation, 
the more likely the need to manage its 
risk in order to reduce the costs related to 
financial distress.
exTernal fUnding and agency cosTs
Another consequence of  financial distress 
is the impact this may have on the 
corporation’s ability to undertake profitable 
future investment. Financial distress may 
make the cost of  external debt and equity 
funding so expensive that a corporation 
and its management may be forced reject 
profitable projects. Academics refer to this 
as the under investment problem.
Equity holders in effect hold a call option 
on a corporation’s assets and debt holders 
can be considered to have written the 
option. In cases of  low financial distress 
the company may be considered to be 
similar to an at-the-money option for its 
equity holders, and, therefore, they would 
be more willing to undertake risky projects 
as they would benefit from any increase in 
profitability, but the impact of  any loss is 
limited. In the case of  substantial financial 
distress, the option could be considered to 
be well out-of-money. In this situation there 
is little (or no) benefit to equity holders of  
undertaking new projects, as the benefits of  
these will pass to the debt holders initially. 
However, debt holders would be reluctant 
to lend to a severely distressed company in 
any case.
Therefore, when raising debt capital, a 
corporation that is subject to low levels 
of  financial distress would face higher 
agency costs, with lenders imposing higher 
borrowing costs and more restrictive 
covenants. Whereas debt holders get a fixed 
return on their investment, any additional 
benefit due to higher profits would go to the 
equity holders. This would make the debt 
holders reluctant to allow the corporation 
to undertake risky projects or to lend 
more finance to the corporation because 
they would not gain any benefit from the 
risky projects.
A corporation that faces high levels of  
financial distress would find it difficult to 
raise equity capital in order to undertake 
new investments. If  corporations try to 
raise equity finance for relatively less risky 
projects then the profits earned from such 
projects would initially go to the debt 
holders and the equity holders will gain only 
residual profits. Therefore equity holders 
would put pressure on the corporation and 
its management to reject good, low risk 
projects, which may have been acceptable 
to the bondholders.
Therefore, risk management in reducing 
financial distress by reducing the volatility 
of  the corporation’s cash inflows may help 
the management to obtain an optimal 
mix of  debt and equity, and to undertake 
profitable projects. 
caPiTal sTrUcTUre and 
informaTion asymmeTry
Risk management can help a corporation 
obtain an optimal capital structure of  
debt and equity to maximise its value. 
Since risk management stabilises the 
variability of  cash inflows, this would 
enable a corporation to take more debt 
finance in its capital structure. Stable cash 
flows indicate less risk and therefore debt 
holders would become more willing to lend 
to the corporation. Since debt is cheaper 
to finance than equity because of  lower 
required rates of  return and the tax shield, 
taking on more debt should increase the 
value of  the corporation. Risk management 
can help achieve this.
Academics have observed that managers 
would prefer to use internally generated 
funds rather than going to the external 
markets for funds because it is cheaper 
and less intrusive on the corporation. They 
suggest that borrowing money from the 
external markets, whether equity or debt, 
would involve parties who do not have the 
complete information about the corporation. 
This information asymmetry would make the 
external sources of  funds more expensive. If  
risk management stabilises the cash flows 
that the corporation receives from year to 
year, then this would enable managers to 
plan when the necessary internal funds will 
become available for future investments 
with greater accuracy. They will then be able 
to align their investment policies with the 
availability of  funding. 
manager behavioUr Towards 
risk managemenT
In his seminal paper, Rene Stulz suggests 
that managers, whose performance reward 
structure includes large equity stakes in a 
corporation, are more likely to reduce the 
corporation’s risk, as opposed to managers 
whose performance reward structure is 
based primarily on equity options. Managers 
who hold concentrated equity stakes in a 
corporation face increased levels of  risk 
when compared to other equity holders. 
As discussed previously, investors hold 
well-diversified portfolios and face exposure 
to systematic risk only. But managers with 
concentrated equity stakes would face 
both systematic and unsystematic risk. 
Therefore, they have a greater propensity to 
reduce the unsystematic risk.
iT is viTal ThaT sTUdenTs are able To aPPly risk 
managemenT TechniQUes, sUch as Using derivaTive 
insTrUmenTs To hedge againsT risk, and offer advice 
and recommendaTions as reQUired by The scenario 
in The QUesTion. iT is also eQUally imPorTanT
ThaT sTUdenTs UndersTand why corPoraTions 
manage risk in Theory and in PracTice.
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However, if  investors do not reward 
corporations that are reducing unsystematic 
risk, because they have diversified this risk 
away themselves. And if  a corporation’s 
managers use the corporation’s resources to 
reduce unsystematic risk, thereby reducing 
the corporation’s value. Then it is worth 
exploring under what circumstances would 
equity investors allow managers to act to 
reduce unsystematic risk and whether such 
actions could actually result in the value of  
the corporation increasing.
Stulz argues that encouraging managers 
to hold concentrated equity positions but 
allowing them to reduce unsystematic risk 
at the same time, may enable them to act 
in the best interests of  the corporation 
and the result may be an increase in the 
corporate value. He explains that managers, 
who do not have to worry about risks that 
are not under their control (because they 
have hedged them away), would be able to 
focus their time, expertise and experience 
on the strategies and operations that they 
can control. This focus may result in the 
increase in the value of  the corporation, 
although the impact of  this increase in 
value is not easily measurable or directly 
attributable to risk management activity.
As an aside, one could pose the question, 
why don’t managers, who are rewarded by 
equity, diversify the risk of  concentrated 
equity investments themselves? They 
could sell equity in their own corporation 
and replace it by buying equity in other 
corporations. In this way they do not have to 
hold concentrated equity positions and then 
would be like the normal equity holders 
facing only systematic risk. A research 
study on wealth management, which looked 
at concentrated equity positions and risk 
management, found that senior managers 
are reluctant to reduce their concentrated 
equity positions because any attempt to sell 
the equity would send negative signals to 
the markets, and cause their corporation’s 
value to decrease unnecessarily.
Contrary to the behaviour of  managers 
who hold concentrated equity stakes, 
managers who own equity options, which 
will be converted into equity at a future 
date, will actively seek to increase the 
risk of  a corporation rather than reduce 
it. Managers who hold equity options are 
interested in maximising the future price of  
the equity. Therefore in order to maximise 
future profits and the price of  the equity, 
they will be more inclined to undertake 
risky projects (and less inclined to manage 
risk). Equity options, as a form of  reward, 
have been often criticised because they do 
not necessarily make managers behave in 
the best interests of  the corporation or its 
equity investors, but encourage them to act 
in an overly risky manner. 
A number of  empirical studies looking 
at manager behaviour support the above 
discussion (see for example Tufano’s study 
published in 1996 in the Journal of  Finance).
TesTing The imPacT of 
risk managemenT
In addition to the above, empirical 
research studies have looked at the risk 
management policies and actions pursued 
by corporations and their impact on 
corporate value. Although the studies have 
provided varying results when studying each 
area of  market imperfections and their 
impact, the overarching conclusion from 
these studies is that: corporations manage 
their risks in the belief  that this would 
create or increase corporate value, although 
a direct link between risk management and 
a corresponding increase in corporate value 
has not been established. 
The jUry is sTill oUT on wheTher risk managemenT acTUally does lead To 
increased corPoraTe valUe. There seem To be sTrong TheoreTical reasons 
for managing risk, bUT emPirical research has noT Proven The imPacT of risk 
managemenT acTiviTy on corPoraTe valUe.
Hence the belief  held among managers 
is that the management of  risk does 
create value, and certainly corporations 
and their senior managers seem to 
believe and act in a manner that it does. 
However, the jury is still out on whether 
risk management actually does lead to 
increased corporate value. There seem to 
be strong theoretical reasons for managing 
risk, but empirical research has not proven 
the impact of  risk management activity 
on corporate value.
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